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McCarthy’s Situation Calculus is arguably the oldest special-purpose knowledge represen-
tation formalism, designed to axiomatize knowledge of actions and their effects. Four
decades of research in this area have led to a variety of alternative formalisms: While
some approaches can be considered instances or extensions of the classical Situation Cal-
culus, like Reiter’s successor state axioms or the Fluent Calculus, there are also special
planning languages like ADL and approaches based on a linear (rather than branching)
time structure like the Event Calculus. The co-existence of many different calculi has two
main disadvantages: The formal relations among them is a largely open issue, and a lot of
today’s research concerns the transfer of speciﬁc results from one approach to another. In
this paper, we present a unifying action calculus, which encompasses (well-deﬁned classes
of) all of the aforementioned formalisms. Our calculus not only facilitates comparisons and
translations between speciﬁc approaches, it also allows to solve interesting problems for
various calculi at once. We exemplify this by providing a general, calculus-independent so-
lution to a problem of practical relevance, which is intimately related to McCarthy’s quest
for elaboration tolerant formalisms: the modularity of domain axiomatizations.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
John McCarthy’s Situation Calculus [22] is arguably the oldest special-purpose knowledge representation formalism. The
aim is to use classical logic to axiomatize knowledge of actions and their effects. This is relevant for a variety of areas in AI,
including planning, intelligent agents, high-level cognitive robotics, natural language understanding, and general game play-
ing. While the Situation Calculus is the classical approach for this purpose, a variety of different logic-based formalisms have
emerged in the course of the past decades, motivated mainly by the fundamental Frame Problem [25]. Besides prominent
variants of the Situation Calculus like Reiter’s successor state axioms [31] or the Fluent Calculus [41], planning languages
like STRIPS, ADL, and PDDL [5,29,26] have been developed, which allow for simple operational solutions to the Frame Prob-
lem at the expense of a signiﬁcantly limited expressiveness. Furthermore, the underlying branching time structure of the
Situation Calculus has been replaced by a linear time structure in the Event Calculus and a number of other approaches
[18,36,4,10]. The basic principles of knowledge representation for actions are also used in special-purpose formalisms like
the Game Description Language [8].
The co-existence of a multitude of knowledge representation languages for actions has two signiﬁcant consequences for
the research in this area. Firstly, there is a growing need both for comparative analysis of the expressiveness of different
approaches as well as for translations from one speciﬁc language into another one. Previous studies along this line are [17,
28,35,3], each of which concerns the comparison of two speciﬁc formalisms. However, a method that encompasses a wide
variety of alternative formalisms at the same time may allow for a more uniform way of assessing and translating calculi.
Secondly, issues of general interest need to be separately addressed within each individual language. This often leads to a
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indirect effects of actions [9], for which a variety of individual solutions have been developed for different formalisms, e.g.,
[19,21,11,40,38,27]. A general method which enables a uniform treatment of problems across different calculi would help to
avoid this multiplication of research efforts.
In this paper, we address both of these issues at the same time by proposing a unifying action calculus, which is
independent of a speciﬁc solution to the Frame Problem and which is shown to be general enough to encompass a variety
of different action representation formalisms. Most notably, it abstracts from the underlying time structure (branching or
linear) and thus can be instantiated with both Situation Calculus-style approaches as well as Event Calculus-like languages.
In so doing, our general calculus provides a uniform method for translating a variety of speciﬁc formalisms into each
other. Moreover, the unifying approach allows to abstract from speciﬁc formalisms when investigating problems of general
interest. We exemplify this by providing a new, calculus-independent solution to a problem of practical relevance for any
action representation language: the modularity of domain axiomatizations [13]. Our result is a contribution to McCarthy’s
quest for elaboration tolerant formalisms [24], since modularity is a prerequisite for elaboration tolerance: theories with a
variety of dependencies among different parts may not allow for the addition of new information without disrupting the
entire axiomatization [14]. We use our unifying action calculus to develop a general method for verifying that a given set of
domain constraints, precondition axioms, and effect formulas is free of undesired, implicit dependencies. We exemplify the
range of applicability of this result by instantiating it for several speciﬁc approaches, in particular the Situation-, Fluent-,
and Event Calculus.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we formally deﬁne an action calculus which
abstracts from a speciﬁc underlying time structure and is independent of a speciﬁc solution to the Frame Problem. We
illustrate the expressiveness of our deﬁnition by formalizing several example domains known from the literature, including
nondeterministic actions, indirect effects, and actions with duration. In Section 3, we show how our unifying calculus can
be used as an intermediary language for translations between speciﬁc languages. Speciﬁcally, we present two new results:
a translation from ADL planning problems into the Event Calculus and a translation from the basic Fluent Calculus into a
new extension—suitable for nondeterministic actions—of Reiter’s basic Situation Calculus. In the second part of the paper,
in Section 4, we show how the unifying action calculus can be used to provide a calculus-independent solution to the
problem of implicit dependencies among domain axioms, and we again exemplify the range of applicability of this result by
instantiating it for several action formalisms. We conclude with a discussion in Section 5.
2. A unifying action calculus
The purpose of this section is to develop a unifying action calculus that abstracts from a variety of existing axioma-
tization techniques for describing actions and change. Logic-based action representation formalisms have in common two
fundamental elements: Fluents [22] (sometimes called features [33]) represent properties of the domain that may change in
response to the execution of actions (or events [18]). Fluents and actions are therefore basic sorts in the sorted logic language
we are going to deﬁne. Action calculi also need to distinguish different points in time in order to axiomatize the changes
caused by actions. We assume an abstract notion of time—which may be linear or branching—as the third fundamental sort.
The three basic sorts are used for three fundamental predicates: The relation t1 < t2 denotes a (possibly partial) ordering
on the time structure. Predicate Holds( f , t) is used to say that ﬂuent f is true at time t . Finally, the intended meaning of
expression Poss(a, s, t) is that it is possible to do action a beginning at time s and ending at time t. These three predicates,
along with the three fundamental sorts, form the basis of a domain signature in our unifying action calculus.
Deﬁnition 1. A domain signature is a ﬁnite, sorted logic language which includes the sorts ﬂuent, action, and time along
with the predicates
<: time× time
Holds: ﬂuent× time
Poss: action× time× time
We tacitly assume that a signature always includes the standard predicate “=”, interpreted as true equality. As usual, then,
s t stands for s < t ∨ s = t .
Throughout the paper we will denote variables of sort action by the letter a, variables of sort ﬂuent by f and g , and
variables of sort time by s and t . We tacitly assume uniqueness-of-names [1] for all functions into ﬂuent and action, which
is a common assumption in all standard action calculi.
Next, we deﬁne the notion of a state formula, which allows to express properties of a domain at given times.
Deﬁnition 2. Let t be a non-empty sequence of variables of sort time in a given domain signature. A state formula in t is a
ﬁrst-order formula Φ[t] in which the variables in t occur free and such that
1. for each occurrence of Holds( f , t) in Φ we have t ∈t;
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Similar notions are used in many existing calculi but usually restricted to a single time point. As will be shown later in
this section, the more general concept is useful, for instance, when axiomatizing actions with ramiﬁcations.
We are now in a position to formalize, in our calculus, three fundamental categories of domain axioms: domain con-
straints, which describe state properties that hold at all times; precondition axioms, which deﬁne the conditions for actions
to be applicable in a state; and effect axioms, which deﬁne the consequences of actions. For the latter, we use a general
form that allows to deﬁne nondeterministic actions with the help of different possible “cases” i = 1, . . . ,k of updates Υi[s, t]
(cf. axiom (1) below). Each of these sub-formulas deﬁnes the ﬂuents that hold after the action, at time t , relative to the
state when the action starts, at time s. This does not only concern all (possibly conditional) effects of an action but also all
non-effects. This formulation is general enough to subsume speciﬁc solutions to the Frame and Ramiﬁcation Problem.
Deﬁnition 3. Consider a domain signature, and let A be a function into sort action.
1. A domain constraint is of the form
δ[t]
which is a state formula in t .1
2. A precondition axiom is of the form
Poss
(
A(x), s, t)≡ πA[s]
where πA[s] is a state formula in s with free variables among s, t, x.
3. An effect axiom is of the form
Poss
(
A(x), s, t)⊃ Υ1[s, t] ∨ · · · ∨Υk[s, t] (1)
where k 1 and each Υi[s, t] (1 i  k) is a formula of the form
(∃yi)
(
Φi[s] ∧ (∀ f )
[
Γ +i [s, t] ⊃ Holds( f , t)
]
∧ (∀ f )[Γ −i [s, t] ⊃ ¬Holds( f , t)]) (2)
in which Φi[s] is a state formula in s with free variables among s, x, y,2 and both Γ +i [s, t] and Γ −i [s, t] are state
formulas in s, t with free variables among f , s, t, x, y.
A domain axiomatization consists of precondition and effect axioms, one each for every function into sort action, along with
a ﬁnite set of domain constraints and a ﬁnite set of foundational axioms without the predicates Holds and Poss.
The purpose of the foundational axioms is to deﬁne the underlying time structure. In the following we present exam-
ple axiomatizations of several domains known from the literature to illustrate the wide range of phenomena that can be
expressed in this unifying calculus.
Example 1 (Branching time, nondeterministic actions). The Situation Calculus and related axiomatization techniques are based
on a branching time-structure, where the situations are commonly deﬁned by the constant S0 : time and the function
Do : action × time 
→ time. A standard example for a nondeterministic action is that of dropping a pin on a checkerboard
[20]. The pin may land on a white square, a black square, or both. Let the ﬂuents Pin(x), White(x), and Black(x) denote
that x is a pin and that it is, respectively, on a white and a black square. The action Drop(x) can then be axiomatized by
the following precondition and effect axiom.
Poss
(
Drop(x), s, t
)≡ Holds(Pin(x), s)∧ ¬Holds(White(x), s)∧ ¬Holds(Black(x), s)
∧ t = Do(Drop(x), s) (3)
Poss
(
Drop(x), s, t
)⊃ ((∀ f )[ f = White(x)∨ Holds( f , s) ⊃ Holds( f , t)]
∧ (∀ f )[ f = White(x)∧ ¬Holds( f , s) ⊃ ¬Holds( f , t)])
∨ ((∀ f )[ f = Black(x)∨ Holds( f , s) ⊃ Holds( f , t)]
1 Throughout the paper, free variables are assumed universally quantiﬁed.
2 The purpose of sub-formula Φi [s] is to deﬁne conditions for case i to apply. Whenever it is tautology, we will simply omit this formula.
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∨ ((∀ f )[ f = White(x)∨ f = Black(x)∨ Holds( f , s) ⊃ Holds( f , t)]
∧ (∀ f )[ f = White(x)∧ f = Black(x)∧ ¬Holds( f , s) ⊃ ¬Holds( f , t)]) (4)
The three disjuncts in the effect axiom encode the three possible outcomes of the nondeterministic action, including the
case where the pin lands on both white and black. Each of the sub-formulas describing the update includes a solution
to the Frame Problem: all ﬂuents except possibly Black(x) and White(x) retain their value in the successor situation
t = Do(Drop(x), s). As an example, suppose given the initial state description,
Holds
(
Pin(A), S0
)∧ ¬Holds(White(A), S0)∧ ¬Holds(Black(A), S0) (5)
along with the observation ¬Holds(White(A),Do(Drop(A), S0)). Together with the domain axioms this implies that
Holds(Black(A),Do(Drop(A), S0)). To see why, from (5) and precondition axiom (3) it follows that Poss(Drop(A), S0,
Do(Drop(A), S0)). The ﬁrst and third disjunct in effect axiom (4) then imply Holds(White(A),Do(Drop(A), S0)), which
contradicts the observation. Therefore the claim follows by the second disjunct.
It is worth mentioning that some nondeterministic actions can be formulated in the unifying calculus without a disjunc-
tive effect axiom, namely by simply excluding one or more ﬂuents from the frame assumption. An example is the following
axiomatization of the effect of tossing a coin.
Poss
(
Toss(c), s, t
)⊃ (∀ f )[ f = Heads(c)∧ Holds( f , s) ⊃ Holds( f , t)]
∧ (∀ f )[ f = Heads(c)∧ ¬Holds( f , s) ⊃ ¬Holds( f , t)]
where ﬂuent Heads(c) denotes that coin c shows heads. This corresponds to the notion of occlusion or release as used in,
e.g., [34] and [37].
Example 2 (Branching time, ramiﬁcations). Consider a variant, introduced in [2], of the famous Yale Shooting scenario [12]
with ﬂuents Loaded, Alive, and Walking representing that a gun is loaded and that the turkey is alive and walking,
respectively. The following domain constraint says that the turkey can walk only if it is alive.
Holds(Walking, t) ⊃ Holds(Alive, t) (6)
Let Load, Wait, and Shoot denote the actions of loading the gun, waiting, and shooting, respectively. Their preconditions
shall be as follows.
Poss(Load, s, t) ≡ t = Do(Load, s)
Poss(Wait, s, t) ≡ t = Do(Wait, s)
Poss(Shoot, s, t) ≡ t = Do(Shoot, s) (7)
The following schema for the effect axioms encodes a combined solution to the Frame and Ramiﬁcation Problem which is a
reformulation of the causal approach described in [10].
Poss(a, s, t) ⊃ (∀ f )[CausedT( f ,a, s, t)∨ ¬CausedF( f ,a, s, t) ⊃ Holds( f , t)]
∧ (∀ f )[CausedF( f ,a, s, t)∨ ¬CausedT( f ,a, s, t) ⊃ ¬Holds( f , t)] (8)
where
CausedT( f ,a, s, t)
def= Holds( f , s)∧ Holds( f , t)
∨ f = Loaded∧ a = Load
CausedF( f ,a, s, t)
def= ¬Holds( f , s)∧ ¬Holds( f , t)
∨ f = Alive∧ Holds(Loaded, s)∧ a = Shoot
∨ f = Walking∧ ¬Holds(Alive, t) (9)
Macro CausedT( f ,a, s, t) combines a positive frame assumption (that is, Holds( f , s)∧ Holds( f , t)) with the possible positive
effects in the domain; here, the fact that the gun becomes loaded by loading it. Likewise, CausedF( f ,a, s, t) combines
a negative frame assumption with the possible negative effects: if the gun is loaded when shooting it, then the turkey
dies; and if in a successor situation the turkey is not alive, then this causes it not to be walking. The latter describes an
indirect effect related to the domain constraint, (6), but conveying additional, causal information to solve the Ramiﬁcation
124 M. Thielscher / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 120–141Problem [10]. (Note also that, after two decades of shooting a turkey in Yale, so doing no longer unloads the gun.) It is easy
to see that action variable a in schema (8) can be instantiated by the three actions of this domain in order to obtain effect
axioms that are actually of the form required by Deﬁnition 3.
The domain axiomatization entails, for example, ¬Holds(Walking,Do(Shoot,Do(Wait,Do(Load, S0)))). To see why,
let S1 = Do(Load, S0), S2 = Do(Wait, S1), and S3 = Do(Shoot, S2). Precondition axioms (7) imply Poss(Load, S0, S1),
Poss(Wait, S1, S2), and Poss(Shoot, S2, S3). From deﬁnition (9), we obtain CausedT(Loaded,Load, S0, S1); hence, effect
axiom (8) entails
Holds(Loaded, S1) (10)
The gun remains loaded through the subsequent Wait action: given uniqueness-of-names, (9) implies that
CausedF(Loaded,Wait, S1, S2) is equivalent to ¬Holds(Loaded, S1) ∧ ¬Holds(Loaded, S2). Because of (10), this actually
implies ¬CausedF(Loaded,Wait, S1, S2). It follows from (8) that
Holds(Loaded, S2) (11)
(It is worth mentioning that this, together with (10), implies CausedT(Loaded,Wait, S1, S2). This is how the Frame Prob-
lem is solved in the axiomatization technique used here: ﬂuent Loaded is “caused” to be true in S2 simply by staying true
from S1 to S2.) Given that the gun is still loaded, the Shoot action has the effect that the turkey dies and, as an indirect
effect, that it stops walking: from (9) and (11) it follows that CausedF(Alive,Shoot, S2, S3). Hence, ¬Holds(Alive, S3)
by (8). This, in turn, implies CausedF(Walking,Shoot, S2, S3) according to (9), from which the claim follows by (8) again.
Example 3 (Linear time, actions with duration). The Event Calculus and other axiomatization techniques use a linear time
structure, like for example the natural numbers. The following scenario is adapted from [33]. Let the ﬂuents Assembled
and Instr denote, respectively, the state of an assembly kit and the availability of assembly instructions. To represent
the occurrence of actions, we add a ﬂuent called Occurs(a, s, t), which describes the fact that action a actually happens,
starting at time s and ending at time t . We consider two actions: Assemble, which has the effect that the kit is assembled
in the end; and the special action Inert, which is used to axiomatize the frame assumption between two time points
when nothing else happens:
Poss(Assemble, s, t) ⊃ (∀ f )[ f = Assembled∨ Holds( f , s) ⊃ Holds( f , t)]
∧ (∀ f )[ f = Assembled∧ ¬Holds( f , s) ⊃ ¬Holds( f , t)]
Poss(Inert, s, t) ⊃ (∀ f )[Holds( f , s) ⊃ Holds( f , t)]
∧ (∀ f )[¬Holds( f , s) ⊃ ¬Holds( f , t)] (12)
The preconditions for the two actions are as follows.
Poss(Assemble, s, t) ≡ Holds(Occurs(Assemble, s, t), s)
∧ [Holds(Instr, s) ⊃ t = s + 20]∧ [¬Holds(Instr, s) ⊃ t = s + 60]
Poss(Inert, s, t) ≡ ¬(∃a, s′, t′)(Holds(Occurs(a, s′, t′), s)∧ s′ < t ∧ t′ > s) (13)
Put in words, assembling has a variable duration, depending on the availability of instructions. The generic Inert action is
possible between any two time points s and t whenever there is no action that starts before t and ends after s. In order that
the second precondition axiom in (13) complies with Deﬁnition 3, the right-hand side must be a state formula in s. This, in
turn, requires all action occurrences to be “known” at all times, which can be easily obtained by the generic deﬁnition of
domain constraints via the following macro.
Happens(a, s, t)
def= (∀t′)Holds(Occurs(a, s, t), t′) (14)
As an example, consider a scenario in which only a single action occurs,
(∃ta)
(
Poss(Assemble,100, ta)∧ (∀a, s, t)
[
Happens(a, s, t) ≡ a = Assemble∧ s = 100∧ t = ta
])
(15)
along with the observation ¬Holds(Assembled,130). This, together with the domain axioms, implies ¬Holds(Instr,0);
that is to say, if the kit is not yet assembled at time 130 then the instructions were not present from the beginning. To see
why, suppose, for the sake of argument, that Poss(Assemble,100,120). We show that this leads to a contradiction: from
(12) it follows that
Holds(Assembled,120) (16)
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Holds(Occurs(a, s′, t′),120) such that t′ > 120. Therefore, Poss(Inert,120,130) according to (13). In turn, this and (16)
imply Holds(Assembled,130) by (12), which contradicts the observation. Hence, ¬Poss(Assemble,100,120). This and
Poss(Assemble,100, ta) entail ¬Holds(Instr,100) due to (13). The claim ¬Holds(Instr,0) then follows from (12) and
the fact that Poss(Inert,0,100) (which the reader may easily verify from (14) and (15)).
These examples show that the unifying calculus allows to model a variety of ontological features. We conclude this
section by deﬁning three important sub-classes of domain axiomatizations, which will be used later in the paper. To begin
with, a domain axiomatization is called progressing if there is a least time point and if time always moves forward when an
action is executed.
Deﬁnition 4. A domain axiomatization with precondition axioms Π and foundational axioms Ω is progressing if
1. Ω | (∃s : time)(∀t : time)s t and
2. Π ∪Ω | Poss(a, s, t) ⊃ s < t .
A domain axiomatization is called sequential if it is progressing and no two actions overlap.
Deﬁnition 5. A domain axiomatization with precondition axioms Π and foundational axioms Ω is sequential if it is pro-
gressing and
Π ∪Ω | Poss(a, s, t)∧ Poss(a′, s′, t′)⊃ (t < t′ ⊃ t  s′)∧ (t = t′ ⊃ a = a′ ∧ s = s′)
In Example 2 we have seen how ramiﬁcations of actions are obtained if an effect depends on conditions of the successor
state, as in
f = Walking∧ ¬Holds(Alive, t) ⊃ ¬Holds( f , t)
(cf. (9) and (8), respectively). This gives rise to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 6. A domain axiomatization is ramiﬁcation-free if each Υi[s, t] in an effect axiom (1) is of the form
(∃yi)
(
Φi[s] ∧ (∀ f )
[
Γ +i [s] ⊃ Holds( f , t)
]
∧ (∀ f )[Γ −i [s] ⊃ ¬Holds( f , t)])
where both Γ +i [s] and Γ −i [s] are state formulas in s.
3. Translations based on the unifying approach
In this section, we show how the unifying calculus can be used as an intermediary language for translating speciﬁc
calculi into each other. The general idea is to map domain descriptions in one language into domain axiomatizations in the
unifying calculus, and then to re-write those into the target language. This provides a uniform method for embedding (well-
deﬁned classes) of domains in a variety of existing approaches, which also allows to compare their relative expressiveness.
The advantage of using the unifying action calculus as a middle language is two-fold:
1. A mapping from the source language into the unifying calculus results in a generic representation, which can then be
further mapped onto a variety of different target languages, thus avoiding the need for complete translations in each
case.
2. Once a mapping into a target language has been developed for a speciﬁc class of domains in the unifying calculus, it
suﬃces to map a source language into that class to obtain a full translation from source to target.
We exemplify our method by two new results: an axiomatic characterization of ADL planning problems in the Event Cal-
culus, and a translation of the basic Fluent Calculus into the Situation Calculus. As a by-product we deﬁne an extension of
Reiter’s basic Situation Calculus which is suitable for nondeterministic actions and which is somewhat more general than
the approach proposed in [20].
3.1. Translating ADL into the event calculus
3.1.1. From ADL . . .
In order to give an Event Calculus characterization of the planning language ADL, introduced in [29], we ﬁrst interpret
ADL in our unifying calculus. For the deﬁnition of this planning language we follow [6].
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of other types; a ﬁnite set of typed constants; a ﬁnite set of typed ﬂuents; and a ﬁnite set of typed action names.
An ADL planning problem is composed of the following elements.
1. For each operator name A(x) a precondition π , which is a ﬁrst-order formula with free variables among x and whose
atoms are ﬂuents F (t) or equalities t1 = t2.
2. For each operator name A(x) a ﬁnite set of effect speciﬁcations, which are of either of the forms
(∀yi)
(
γ+i ⇒ Fi(yi)
)
or (∀y j)
(
γ−j ⇒ ¬F j(y j)
)
(17)
where the conditions γ+i and γ
−
j are ﬁrst-order formulas with free variables among, respectively, x, yi and x, y j , and
whose atoms are ﬂuents F (t) or equalities t1 = t2.3
3. A conjunction of ground ﬂuent literals as the (possibly incomplete) initial state speciﬁcation and a closed ﬁrst-order
formula as the planning goal.
Example 4. Consider the following speciﬁcation of the action Move(object,old,new) in the well-known blocksworld:
Precondition: On(object,old)∧ ¬(old= new)
∧ ¬(∃z)On(z,object)∧ ¬(∃z)On(z,new)
Effects: (∀x, y)(x = object∧ y = new ⇒ On(x, y))
(∀x, y)(x = object∧ y = old ⇒ ¬On(x, y))
(∀x, y)(x = object∧ y = new ⇒ Above(x, y))
(∀x, z)(x = object∧ Above(new, z) ⇒ Above(x, z))
(∀x, z)(x = object∧ Above(x, z) ⇒ ¬Above(x, z)) (18)
The bottommost two expressions specify an unbounded number of effects, which is one of the characteristic features of ADL
that go beyond the expressiveness of STRIPS.
The semantics of an ADL domain description requires the deﬁnition of a transition function on complete states. These
are represented as ground sets of ﬂuents S , and the basis for entailment is the deﬁnition S | F (t) iff F (t) ∈ S for a ground
ﬂuent F (t).
Deﬁnition 8. Consider an ADL planning problem, and let S and S ′ be two sets of ground ﬂuents and A(t) a ground instance
of an action with precondition π and effect speciﬁcations (17), then
S A(t) S ′
if the action is applicable in S , that is, S | π{x 
→ t}, and if S ′ = S \ D ∪ A, where the delete-list D is the set of all
ground ﬂuents F j(r) such that S | γ−j {x 
→ t, y j 
→ r} and the add-list A is the set of all ground ﬂuents Fi(r) such that
S | γ+i {x 
→ t, yi 
→ r}.
A sequence α1, . . . ,αn of ground actions is a solution to the planning problem if for every S0 which satisﬁes the initial
state,
S0α1 · · ·αn Sn
such that Sn entails the planning goal.
Because it is not a purely logical axiomatization, an ADL description does not presuppose a particular time structure. This
allows for various interpretations; for example, [3] uses branching time for an embedding of ADL in the Situation Calculus.
In view of a translation into the Event Calculus, we map ADL planning problems into our unifying calculus using a linear
time structure, speciﬁcally the natural numbers. To begin with, the type declarations are taken as a speciﬁcation of domain
sorts. The ADL operator names are mapped onto functions into sort action, and the ADL ﬂuents are mapped onto functions
into sort ﬂuent. Much like in Example 3, we add the special ﬂuent Occurs(a : action, t : N) to represent the occurrence
of an action at a speciﬁc time. An ADL domain description can then be translated into a domain axiomatization using our
unifying calculus as follows.
3 The original deﬁnition actually allows to partially instantiate the arguments of the ﬂuents Fi(yi) and F j(y j) in (17). For the sake of simplicity, we
assume that this is equivalently represented by equations in γ+i and γ
−
j , respectively.
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2. The precondition axioms are,
Poss
(
A(x), s, t)≡ Holds(Occurs(A(x), s), s)∧ t = s + 1∧πA[s] (19)
where πA[s] is the ADL precondition for operator A(x) but with every occurrence of a ﬂuent φ replaced by Holds(φ, s).
3. The effect axioms are,
Poss
(
A(x), s, t)⊃ (∀ f )[(Γ +A ∨ Holds( f , s)∧ ¬Γ −A )⊃ Holds( f , t)]
∧ (∀ f )[(Γ −A ∨ ¬Holds( f , s)∧ ¬Γ +A )⊃ ¬Holds( f , t)] (20)
where
Γ +A
def=
∨
i
(∃yi)
(
γ+i [s] ∧ f = F (yi)
)
Γ −A
def=
∨
j
(∃y j)
(
γ−j [s] ∧ f = F (y j)
)
(21)
Here, γ+i [s] and γ−j [s] are as γ+i and γ−j in the ADL effect speciﬁcations for action A(x) but with every ﬂuent φ
replaced by Holds(φ, s).
4. An initial state I is mapped to the formula I[0] where every ﬂuent φ is replaced by Holds(φ,0).
5. A sequence of actions α1, . . . ,αn is mapped onto the formula
(∀t)(Holds(Occurs(a, s), t)≡ a = α1 ∧ s = 0∨ · · · ∨ a = αn ∧ s = n− 1) (22)
Example 4 (Continued). Recall effect speciﬁcations (18). These are mapped onto the general effect axiom (20) for
Move(object,old,new) with
Γ +Move
def= f = On(object,new)∨ f = Above(object,new)
∨ (∃z)(Holds(Above(new, z), s)∧ f = Above(object, z))
Γ −Move
def= f = On(object,old)
∨ (∃z)(Holds(Above(object, z), s)∧ f = Above(object, z)) (23)
The mapping of ADL into the unifying calculus can be easily proved correct under the assumption that the effect speci-
ﬁcations (17) for every action are consistent, that is,
| ¬
(∨
i
γ+i ∧
∨
j
γ−j
)
(24)
where i and j range over all effect formulas for the same ﬂuent.
Proposition 9. Let Σ be the domain axiomatization obtained from a consistent ADL domain with goal G, then a sequence of actions
α1, . . . ,αn is a solution to the planning problem iff
Σ ∪ {(22)} | G[n]
where G[n] is G but with every ﬂuent φ replaced by Holds(φ,n).
Proof. Let S,S ′ be two sets of ground ﬂuents, s a time point, and A(t) a ground action. In the following, by S[s] we denote
the conjunction of all atoms Holds(φ, s) for which φ ∈ S , plus all ¬Holds(φ, s) for ground ﬂuents such that φ /∈ S . This is
possible because there are only ﬁnitely many ﬂuent functions and object constants.
Since the ﬂuent for action occurrences does not feature in the ADL effect speciﬁcations, effect axiom (20) implies that
Holds
(
Occurs(a, s), t
)⊃ (∀t′)Holds(Occurs(a, s), t′)
From (19) it then follows that A(t) is applicable in S iff
Σ ∪ {Holds(Occurs(A(t), s), s)} | S[s] ⊃ Poss(A(t), s, s + 1)
Under the consistency assumption (24), effect axiom (20) then implies that S A(t) S ′ iff
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since, by Deﬁnition 8, for any ground ﬂuent we have Fi(r) ∈ A iff S | γ+i {x 
→ t, y 
→ r} iff S[s] | Γ +{x 
→ t, y 
→ r}, and
F j(r) ∈ D iff S | γ−j {x 
→ t, y 
→ r} iff S[s] | Γ −{x 
→ t, y 
→ r}. Hence, F (t) ∈ S \ D ∪ A iff {(20)} ∪ {Poss(A(t), s, s + 1)} |
S[s] ⊃ Holds(F (t), s+ 1), and, conversely, F (t) /∈ S \ D ∪ A iff {(20)} ∪ {Poss(A(t), s, s+ 1)} | S[s] ⊃ ¬Holds(F (t), s+ 1). This
shows that the precondition and effect axioms correctly encode the update of states in ADL according to Deﬁnition 8. The
claim then follows by straightforward induction on n. 
3.1.2. . . . to the Event Calculus
The Event Calculus uses a linear time structure, which allows us to adopt directly the natural numbers used in the
axiomatization of an ADL planning problem from above. In the simple Event Calculus [37], the predicate Happens(a, t)
denotes the occurrence of an action (a.k.a. event) at a given time point. Effects of actions are axiomatized based on the
predicates Initiates(a, f , t) and Terminates(a, f , t) representing, respectively, the initiation and termination of ﬂuent f at
time t by action a. The Frame Problem is then solved in two steps. First, by minimizing predicates Initiates and Terminates
using circumscription [23], and then by applying the following foundational axioms, where InitP ( f ) and InitN ( f ) are used
to specify positive and negative initial conditions.
Holds( f , t) ⊂ InitP ( f )∧ ¬Clipped(0, f , t)
∨ (∃a, s)(Happens(a, s)∧ Initiates(a, f , s)∧ s < t ∧ ¬Clipped(s, f , t))
¬Holds( f , t) ⊂ InitN( f )∧ ¬Declipped(0, f , t)
∨ (∃a, s)(Happens(a, s)∧ Terminates(a, f , s)∧ s < t ∧ ¬Declipped(s, f , t))
Clipped(s, f , t)
def= (∃a, t′)(Happens(a, t′)∧ Terminates(a, f , t′)∧ s < t′ < t)
Declipped(s, f , t)
def= (∃a, t′)(Happens(a, t′)∧ Initiates(a, f , t′)∧ s < t′ < t) (25)
Put in words, a ﬂuent holds at time t if it is true initially or is initiated by an earlier action and not terminated in between
(deﬁnition Clipped). Conversely, a ﬂuent does not hold at time t if it is false initially or terminated by an earlier action and
not initiated in between (deﬁnition Declipped).
In the following we show how the domain axiomatization resulting from mapping an ADL planning problem into our
unifying calculus can be translated into the simple Event Calculus. Generally, the translation of a domain axiomatization
into a language based on a linear time structure would require to introduce a special “occurrence” ﬂuent Occurs(a, s) and
to identify, in case of the simple Event Calculus with natural numbers, the predicate Happens(a, s) with Poss(a, s, s + 1) ∧
Holds(Occurs(a, s), s). For the sake of simplicity, however, we can exploit the fact that this ﬂuent is already present in the
domain axiomatizations of ADL planning problems. In this way, we obtain the following translation into the Event Calculus.
1. The sorts, actions, and ﬂuents are the same.
2. The foundational axioms on the time structure are augmented by (25).
3. The precondition axioms (19) are re-written to
Happens
(
A(x), s)⊃ πA[s] (26)
4. The set of effect axioms (20) is translated into the formulas
Γ +A ⊃ Initiates
(
A(x), f , s)
Γ −A ⊃ Terminates
(
A(x), f , s) (27)
Predicates Initiates and Terminates are circumscribed locally, which results in the second-order axiom
CIRC
[∨
A
( 27); Initiates,Terminates
]
(28)
5. The initial formula I[0] is mapped onto a formula where each Holds( f ,0) is replaced by InitP ( f ) and each ¬Holds( f ,0)
by InitN ( f ).
6. The encoding of a plan, (22), remains unchanged.
Example 4 (Continued). Recall the sub-formulas (23) of the general effect axiom (20). Assuming that Move is the only action
in this domain with an actual effect, the corresponding Event Calculus deﬁnition of initiation and termination is equivalent
to the following.
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(
Move(object,old,new),On(object,new), s)
Initiates
(
Move(object,old,new),Above(object,new), s)
Initiates
(
Move(object,old,new),Above(object, z), s)⊂ Holds(Above(new, z), s)
Terminates
(
Move(object,old,new),On(object,old), s)
Terminates
(
Move(object,old,new),Above(object, z), s)⊂ Holds(Above(object, z), s)
The equivalence of the domain constraints and precondition axioms are obvious. The correctness of the translation of the
effect axioms is given by the following result.
Proposition 10. LetΣ be a domain axiomatization resulting from an ADL planning problem, and let α1, . . . ,αn be an action sequence
such that Σ | Poss(α1,0,1)∧ · · · ∧ Poss(αn,n − 1,n). Let ΣEC be the mapping of Σ into the Event Calculus, then for any ﬂuent φ
Σ | (¬)Holds(φ, t) iff ΣEC | (¬)Holds(φ, t)
for all t = 1, . . . ,n.
Proof. Suppose Σ | Holds(φ, t), then by (20), Σ | Γ +αt ∨Holds(φ, t − 1)∧ ¬Γ −αt . Correspondingly, foundational axioms (25)
imply that if ΣEC | Holds(φ, t), then ΣEC entails either
1. Initiates(αt , φ, t − 1), or
2. (∃m, s)(Initiates(αm, φ,m− 1)∧m< n− 1∧ ¬Clipped(m, φ,n)), or
3. InitP (φ)∧ ¬Clipped(0, φ,n).
By (28), the ﬁrst case is equivalent to Γ +αt while the other two, by (25) and (28), are equivalent to Holds(φ, t − 1)∧ ¬Γ −αt .
Suppose Σ | ¬Holds(φ, t), then by (20), Σ | Γ −αt ∨ ¬Holds(φ, t − 1) ∧ ¬Γ +αt . Correspondingly, foundational axioms (25)
imply that if ΣEC | ¬Holds(φ, t), then ΣEC entails either
1. Terminates(αt , φ, t − 1), or
2. (∃m, s)(Terminates(αm, φ,m− 1)∧m< n − 1∧ ¬Declipped(m, φ,n)), or
3. InitN(φ)∧ ¬Declipped(0, φ,n).
By (28), the ﬁrst case is equivalent to Γ −αt while the other two, by (25) and (28), are equivalent to ¬Holds(φ, t − 1) ∧¬Γ +αt . 
Together with Proposition 9 this shows that we have obtained a correct translation of ADL planning problems into the
Event Calculus.
3.2. Translating the Fluent Calculus into the Situation Calculus
As a second result, we present a translation from the simple Fluent Calculus via the unifying calculus into the Situation
Calculus based on Reiter’s solution to the Frame Problem. As a by-product we obtain an extension of the latter suitable for
nondeterministic actions.
3.2.1. From the Fluent Calculus . . .
The Fluent Calculus is a variant of the Situation Calculus which uses the same branching time structure (cf. Example 2)
and which adds to it a sort state as an explicit representation for states. Intuitively, a state is identiﬁed with the ﬂuents that
hold in it. The state in situation s is denoted by the standard function State(s). By deﬁnition, each ﬂuent itself is a (singleton)
state, and if z1 and z2 are states, then so is their composition denoted by z1 ◦ z2. The empty state is represented by the
special constant ∅. The behavior of the function “◦” is governed by the following foundational axioms, which essentially
deﬁne states as non-nested sets of ﬂuents. In the following, Holds( f , z) is used as an abbreviation for the equational formula
(∃z′)z = f ◦ z′ , which amounts to an axiomatic characterization of set membership.4
(z1 ◦ z2) ◦ z3 = z1 ◦ (z2 ◦ z3) z1 ◦ z2 = z2 ◦ z1
¬Holds( f ,∅) Holds( f1, f ) ⊃ f1 = f
Holds( f , z1 ◦ z2) ⊃ Holds( f , z1)∨ Holds( f , z2) (∀ f )(Holds( f , z1) ≡ Holds( f , z2)) ⊃ z1 = z2
(∀P )(∃z)(∀ f )(Holds( f , z) ≡ P ( f )) (29)
4 Below, the letter z always denotes variables of sort state.
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(possibly inﬁnite) set of ﬂuents. These axioms are accompanied by the foundational axioms on situations, inherited from
the Situation Calculus of [30]:
(∀s)¬s < S0(∀a,a′, s, s′)(Do(a, s) = Do(a′, s′)⊃ a = a′ ∧ s = s′)(∀a, s, s′)(s < Do(a, s′)≡ s s′)
(∀P )(P (S0)∧ (∀a, s)(P (s) ⊃ P (Do(a, s)))⊃ (∀s)P (s)) (30)
The last axiom, where P is a second-order predicate variable of sort sit, deﬁnes an induction principle over situations: if
the initial situation satisﬁes a property P and this property is preserved through the execution of actions, then P is true for
all situations.
Effects of actions are speciﬁed in the Fluent Calculus with the help of a purely axiomatic characterization of subtraction
and addition of ﬂuents from and to states:
z2 = z1 + f def= z2 = z1 ◦ f
z2 = z1 − f def= (z2 = z1 ∨ z2 ◦ f = z1)∧ ¬Holds( f , z2)
These macros can be straightforwardly generalized to the subtraction and addition of ﬁnitely many ﬂuents. On this ba-
sis, domains are axiomatized in the simple Fluent Calculus as follows, where the expression Holds( f , s) in uniform state
formulas (in the sense of Deﬁnition 2) stands for Holds( f , State(s)).
Deﬁnition 11. A simple Fluent Calculus domain is composed of the following elements.
1. Domain constraints, which are of the form
δ[s] (31)
where δ is a state formula in s.
2. Precondition axioms, one for every action A(x), which are of the form
Poss
(
A(x), s)≡ πA[s] (32)
where πA[s] is a state formula in s with free variables among s, x.
3. So-called state update axioms, one for every action A(x), which are of the form
Poss
(
A(x), s)⊃ (∃y1)(Φ1[s] ∧ State(Do(A(x), s))= State(s)− ϑ−1 + ϑ+1 )
∨ · · · ∨
(∃yn)
(
Φn[s] ∧ State
(
Do
(
A(x), s))= State(s)− ϑ−n + ϑ+n ) (33)
where each Φi[s] is a state formula in s with free variables among s, x, yi and ϑ−i (the negative effects) and ϑ+i
(the positive effects) stand for zero or more subtractions and additions, respectively, of ﬂuent terms with variables
among x, yi .
The basic theorem of the Fluent Calculus (see, e.g., [42]) says that the equations in state update axioms provide a solution
to the Frame Problem.
Theorem 12. Foundational axioms (29) entail that
State
(
s′
)= State(s)− g1 − · · · − gm + f1 + · · · + fn
implies
Holds
(
f , State
(
s′
))≡∨
i
f = f i ∨
[
Holds
(
f , State(s)
)∧∧
j
f = g j
]
and vice versa.
A state update axiom (33) speciﬁes an action with indeterminate effects if n> 1 and the conditions Φi are not mutually
exclusive. But an action can also be nondeterministic if its state update axiom has a single update equation which is
accompanied by an underspeciﬁed condition.
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Poss(Pay, s) ⊃ (∃y)(Holds(HasPayment(y), s)∧ State(Do(Pay, s))= State(s)− HasPayment(y)) (34)
Suppose, for example, Holds(HasPayment(y), S0) ≡ y = Cash ∨ y = Cheque, then according to Theorem 12 this state
update axiom implies
¬Holds(HasPayment(Cash),Do(Pay, S0))∨ ¬Holds(HasPayment(Cheque),Do(Pay, S0))
but neither of the disjuncts alone is entailed.
Based on Theorem 12, the translation of basic Fluent Calculus theories into our unifying calculus is straightforward.
Domain constraints are taken as they are. A precondition axiom (32) is re-written as
Poss
(
A(x), s, t)≡ πA[s] ∧ t = Do(A(x), s) (35)
A state update axiom (33) is mapped onto the effect axiom
Poss
(
A(x), s, t)⊃ (∃y1)
(
Φ1[s] ∧ (∀ f )
[∨
i
f = f1i ∨ Holds( f , s)∧
∧
j
f = g1 j ⊃ Holds( f , t)
]
∧ (∀ f )
[∨
j
f = g1 j ∨ ¬Holds( f , s)∧
∧
i
f = f1i ⊃ ¬Holds( f , t)
])
∨ · · · ∨
(∃yn)
(
Φn[s] ∧ (∀ f )
[∨
i
f = fni ∨ Holds( f , s)∧
∧
j
f = gnj ⊃ Holds( f , t)
]
∧ (∀ f )
[∨
j
f = gnj ∨ ¬Holds( f , s)∧
∧
i
f = fni ⊃ ¬Holds( f , t)
])
(36)
Here, the fki and gkj are the ﬂuent terms that occur in ϑ
+
k and ϑ
−
k , respectively. The equivalence of this mapping is obvious
for both domain constraints and precondition axioms. As the following proposition shows, correctness of the effect axioms
follows if the updates are consistent, that is,∧
i
∧
j
fki = gkj (37)
for all k = 1, . . . ,n.
Proposition 13. Suppose Poss(A(x), s) and Poss(A(x), s, t) ≡ t = Do(A(x), s), and assume that (37) holds for a state update axiom
(33), then the foundational axioms of the Fluent Calculus imply that (33) and (36) are equivalent.
Proof. Under the consistency assumption, the implication
∨
j
f = gkj ∨
[
¬Holds( f , s)∧
∧
i
f = fki
]
⊃ ¬Holds( f , t)
is logically equivalent to
Holds( f , t) ⊃
[∧
j
f = gkj ∧ Holds( f , s)
]
∨
∨
i
f = fki
Hence, (36) can be equivalently written as
Poss
(
A(x), s, t)⊃∨
k
(∃yk)
(
Φk[s] ∧ (∀ f )
[∨
i
f = fki ∨ Holds( f , s)∧
∧
j
f = gkj ≡ Holds( f , t)
])
(38)
The equivalence of this effect axiom and state update axiom (33) follows immediately from Theorem 12. 
Example 5 (Continued). Recall state update axiom (34) for the Pay action. The corresponding effect axiom is
Poss(Pay, s, t) ⊃
(∃y)(Holds(HasPayment(y), s) ∧ (∀ f )[Holds( f , s)∧ f = HasPayment(y) ⊃ Holds( f , t)]
∧ (∀ f )[¬Holds( f , s)∨ f = HasPayment(y) ⊃ ¬Holds( f , t)])
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Poss(Pay, s, t) ⊃
(∃y)(Holds(HasPayment(y), s)∧ (∀ f )[Holds( f , s)∧ f = HasPayment(y) ≡ Holds( f , t)]) (39)
3.2.2. . . . to the Situation Calculus
In the following, we show how a domain axiomatization resulting from a Fluent Calculus domain can be mapped onto
the Situation Calculus using so-called successor state axioms [31] for each ﬂuent F (u) as a solution to the Frame Problem.
The general form of these axioms in the reiﬁed version (that is, where ﬂuents are represented as terms) is
Poss(a, s) ⊃ [Holds(F (u),Do(a, s))≡ Γ +F [s] ∨Holds(F (u), s)∧ ¬Γ −F [s]] (40)
Here, Γ +F and Γ
−
F describe the conditions on a, s, u under which ﬂuent F (u) is, respectively, a positive or a negative effect.
Reiter’s basic action theories do not, however, allow to axiomatize nondeterministic actions. In [20], it has been shown
how a generic predicate Case(k,a, s), where k : N, can be used in the sub-formulas Γ +F and Γ −F to model nondeterministic
effects by distinguishing different “cases” of updates. For a correct mapping of effect axioms of the form (38), however, this
concept needs to be generalized in view of actions which are characterized by an underspeciﬁed condition, like action Pay
(cf. axiom (34)). To this end, we introduce, for every action A(x) with effect axiom (36), the more general predicates
CaseAk (x, yk, s)
for every k = 1, . . . ,n. The behavior of these predicates is governed by the following axioms.5
Poss
(
A(x), s)⊃⊕
k
(∃yk)
(
CaseAk (x, yk, s)∧Φk[s]
)
(∀yk, y′k)(CaseAk (x, yk, s)∧ CaseAk (x, y′k, s)⊃ yk = y′k) (41)
Put in words, for every situation s in which the action is possible, there exists a unique applicable “case” k with a unique
instance yk .
We are now in a position to map an axiomatization characterizing a Fluent Calculus domain into the Situation Calculus,
provided the original Fluent Calculus domain satisﬁes the consistency assumption (37). Domain constraints are taken as
they are while precondition axioms (35) are re-written to
Poss
(
A(x), s)≡ πA[s] (42)
Given in their equivalent form (38), the effect axioms are all together mapped onto the following schema for the (possibly
nondeterministic) successor state axioms.
Poss(a, s) ⊃
[
Holds
(
f ,Do(a, s)
)≡∨
A
(∃x)
(
a = A(x)∧
∨
k
(∃yk)
(
CaseAk (x, yk, s)∧
∨
i
f = fki
))
∨ (∃x)
(
a = A(x)∧ Holds( f , s)∧ ¬
[∨
k
(∃yk)
(
CaseAk (x, yk, s)∧
∨
j
f = gkj
)])]
(43)
The ﬂuent variable f in this schema can then be instantiated by all ﬂuents of the domain in order to obtain actual successor
state axioms.
Example 5 (Continued). Recall general effect axiom (34) for the Pay action. Assuming this to be the only action in the
domain, we obtain the following successor state axiom schema.
Poss(a, s) ⊃ [Holds( f ,Do(a, s))≡ a = Pay∧ Holds( f , s)∧ ¬[(∃y)CasePay1 (y, s)∧ f = HasPayment(y)]] (44)
along with the “case” axiom6
Poss(Pay, s) ⊃ (∃!y)(CasePay1 (y, s)∧ HasPayment(y, s))
Instantiating (44) for ﬂuent { f 
→ HasPayment(y)}, we obtain
Poss(a, s) ⊃ [Holds(HasPayment(y),Do(a, s))≡ a = Pay∧ Holds(HasPayment(y), s)∧ ¬CasePay1 (y, s)]
5 Below, the notation
⊕
k Fk means that exactly one of the sub-formulas Fk is true.
6 Below, the notation (∃!y)F means the existence of a unique instance y such that sub-formula F is true.
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Proposition 14. Suppose Poss(A(x), s) and Poss(A(x), s, t) ≡ t = Do(A(x), s), then (36) and (43), instantiated by {a 
→ A(x)}, are
equivalent under axioms (41).
Proof. Instantiating (43) by {a 
→ A(x)}, we obtain
Holds
(
f ,Do
(
A(x), s))≡∨
k
(∃yk)
(
CaseAk (x, yk, s)∧
∨
i
f = fki
)
∨ Holds( f , s)∧ ¬
[∨
k
(∃yk)CaseAk (x, yk, s)∧
∨
j
f = gkj
]
Given (41), this can be re-written to
∨
k
(∃yk)
(
Φk[s] ∧ (∀ f )
[
Holds
(
f ,Do
(
A(x), s))≡∨
i
f = fki ∨ Holds( f , s)∧ ¬
[∨
j
f = gkj
]])
which, given Poss(A(x), s, t) ≡ t = Do(A(x), s), is equivalent to (38). 
We have thus obtained, with the help of the unifying calculus, an embedding of the full basic Fluent Calculus into the
Situation Calculus using a variant of successor state axioms which is suitable for nondeterministic actions and somewhat
more general than [20]. The translation itself generalizes an earlier result that was restricted to deterministic actions [35].
3.3. Translations into different time structures
The two example translations presented above have in common that the target language uses the same time structure as
the input language. Since the unifying action calculus is not conﬁned to a particular time structure, it can also serve as in-
termediary language for translating approaches with different time structures into each other. Domain axiomatizations with
branching time, such as situations in the Situation- or the Fluent Calculus, can be mapped onto a linear time structure by
introducing a special ﬂuent to denote the actual occurrence of an action, like Occurs, and adding this to the precondition
so that the possibility of an action can be identiﬁed with its actual occurrence. Conversely, domain axiomatizations with
linear time (with time points t) can be mapped onto a branching time structure (with time points s) by adding a special
ﬂuent Time(s, t) to denote that t is the “actual” time of a branching time point s. Precondition and effect axioms in the
target language then inherit the relation between the beginning and end of an action as speciﬁed in the domain axioms
with the linear time structure.
4. Modularity of domain axiomatizations
In this second part of the paper, we show how the unifying action calculus allows us to analyze and solve problems
of general interest across different formalisms. The motivation for using the unifying approach is that it enables proofs
of results without being conﬁned to a speciﬁc approach. Once established, instantiating such a result to a particular action
calculus is likely to be much easier than solving the problem individually and from the scratch for each individual formalism.
We exemplify this by providing a new, calculus-independent solution to a problem that arises across different approaches:
the question whether a domain axiomatization is modular. This problem, which has recently gained interest [15], is of
particular relevance for the practical use of domain axiomatizations in high-level action programming languages like GOLOG
[32] or FLUX [42], and it is intimately related to McCarthy’s concept of elaboration tolerance [24].
The problem of modularity arises from the fact that axiomatizations of action domains combine different categories of
formulas which serve different purposes. Domain constraints describe static properties which hold in all states; precondition
axioms deﬁne the conditions for actions to be applicable; and effect axioms deﬁne the consequences of actions. As a uniform
logical theory, however, a domain axiomatization may easily give rise to dependencies among the different kinds of axioms:
effect formulas can entail implicit preconditions, domain constraints can entail implicit effects, etc. [13]. Implementations
like GOLOG or FLUX, on the other hand, rely on the assumption that dependencies like these do not exist. The reason is
that, for the sake of eﬃciency, the implementations use domain axiomatizations in a modular fashion: agents refer to the
domain constraints only when they initialize their world model, they check the applicability of an action merely against the
precondition axioms, and they update their world model entirely on the basis of the effect axioms. Agent programs would
be much less eﬃcient if the entire domain theory had to be taken into account for each speciﬁc reasoning task. However,
this modular use of a domain axiomatization is incorrect whenever there is a dependency between axioms of different kind.
As a consequence, the modularity of a domain axiomatization must always be veriﬁed prior to using it as the knowledge
base for an agent. This is an excellent example of the value of McCarthy’s elaboration tolerance principle [24]: the more
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of new information may disrupt an entire existing axiomatization if it is not modular [14].
In the following, we use our unifying action calculus as the formal basis for a general, calculus-independent analysis of
the problem of modularity of domain constraints, precondition axioms, and effect formulas in domain axiomatizations. We
present conditions for modularity against which a domain axiomatization can be checked. As the main result, we prove that
the class of sequential and ramiﬁcation-free domain axiomatizations, as deﬁned at the end of Section 2, are guaranteed to
be free of dependencies if they satisfy these conditions. We then show how this result can be straightforwardly instantiated
to several concrete formalisms. In this way, our general conditions for independence can be easily checked, e.g., by applying
automated theorem proving, for a given domain theory in a speciﬁc action calculus.
4.1. Examples for implicit dependency
In order to illustrate the universality of the problem of modularity, we ﬁrst present three simple example axiomatizations
in three different calculi which entail implicit domain constraints, preconditions, and effects, respectively.
4.1.1. Implicit domain constraints
The ﬁrst example, axiomatized in the Situation Calculus, shows how effect axioms—successor state axioms in this case—
may entail additional, implicit domain constraints.
Example 6. For a scheduling domain consider the ﬂuents Job(m, j) and Free(m), respectively representing that machine m
has been allocated job j and that machine m is free. Two actions Schedule( j,m) and Unschedule( j) are for allocating
job j to machine m and for deallocating job j.
Consider the single domain constraint7
Holds
(
Free(m), t
)⊃ ¬(∃ j)Holds(Job(m, j), t) (45)
Let the action precondition axioms be
Poss
(
Schedule( j,m), s
)≡ Holds(Free(m), s)
Poss
(
Unschedule( j), s
)≡ (∃m)Holds(Job(m, j), s) (46)
The successor state axioms for the two ﬂuents are as follows.
Poss(a, s) ⊃ [Holds(Job(m, j),Do(a, s))≡ a = Schedule( j,m)
∨ Holds(Job(m, j), s)∧ a = Unschedule( j)]
Poss(a, s) ⊃ [Holds(Free(m),Do(a, s))≡ (∃ j)(Holds(Job(m, j), s)∧ a = Unschedule( j))
∨ Holds(Free(m), s)∧ ¬(∃ j)a = Schedule( j,m)] (47)
Put in words, Job(m, j) holds in a successor situation if job j was just allocated to machine m, or if Job(m, j) was true
beforehand and j was not deallocated. Similarly, Free(m) holds in a successor situation if the job allocated to m just got
unscheduled, or if machine m was free beforehand and has not just got some job j.
We claim that this axiomatization entails the following implicit domain constraint (which does not follow from (45)
alone):
Holds
(
Job(m, j), s
)⊃ ¬(∃i)(Holds(Job(m, i), s)∧ j = i) (48)
To see why, suppose Holds(Job(m, j), s), then (46) implies Poss(Unschedule( j), s). By (47),
Holds
(
Free(m),Do
(
Unschedule( j), s
))
Hence, from (45) it follows that
¬(∃i)Holds(Job(m, i),Do(Unschedule( j), s)) (49)
Also, by (47) and uniqueness-of-names,
Holds
(
Job(m, i),Do
(
Unschedule( j), s
))≡ Holds(Job(m, i), s)∧ j = i
This and (49) imply ¬(∃i)(Holds(Job(m, i), s)∧ j = i).
7 It should be stressed that the converse of the following implication is left out intentionally; that is to say, for many other reasons a machine may not
be available even if it has not been allocated a job.
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The next example, which is axiomatized in the simple Event Calculus as introduced in Section 3.1.2, shows how effect
axioms can give rise to implicit preconditions of actions.
Example 7. To model the movement of a robot, consider the ﬂuent At(x) representing that the robot is at position x. The
action Go(x, y) denotes the movement of the robot from x to y. Let the domain axiomatization consist of the single domain
constraint
Holds
(
At(l1), t
)∧ Holds(At(l2), t)⊃ l1 = l2 (50)
Put in words, the robot must be at a unique location at any time. Let the precondition of the only action be axiomatized as
Happens
(
Go(x, y), s
)⊃ Holds(At(x), s) (51)
The effects in this domain are determined by the following circumscribed deﬁnition of initiation and termination.
Initiates(a, f , s) ≡ (∃x, y)( f = At(y)∧ a = Go(x, y))
Terminates(a, f , s) ≡ (∃x, y)( f = At(x)∧ a = Go(x, y)) (52)
We claim that, under the assumption that the Go action can be performed in isolation, this axiomatization entails the
following implicit precondition (which does not follow from (51) alone):
Happens
(
Go(x, y), s
)⊃ x = y (53)
To see why, (52) implies both Initiates(Go(x, y),At(y), s) and Terminates(Go(x, y),At(x), s). Suppose Happens(a, s) ≡ a =
Go(x, y), then foundational axioms (25) entail both Holds(At(y), t) as well as the negation ¬Holds(At(x), t) for t > s, which
in turn implies x = y.
4.1.3. Implicit effects
The last example, given in the basic Fluent Calculus, shows how domain constraints can give rise to additional, implicit
effects.
Example 8. To model the operation of two elevators, consider the ﬂuent AtFloor(e,n) with e ∈ {E1,E2} and n ∈
{0,1, . . . ,9}, representing the current ﬂoor of each elevator. The only action Call(n) means to activate the call button
at ﬂoor n. Let the domain axiomatization consist of the two domain constraints,
(∃!k)Holds(AtFloor(e,k), t)
¬Holds(AtFloor(E1,0), t) (54)
that is to say, both elevators are at a unique ﬂoor in every situation, and the ﬁrst elevator does not serve the basement. We
assume that it is possible to activate the call button at any ﬂoor as long as there is no elevator at this ﬂoor, that is,
Poss
(
Call(n), s
)≡ 0 n 9∧ ¬(∃e)Holds(AtFloor(e,n), s) (55)
The following state update axiom speciﬁes a nondeterministic effect.
Poss
(
Call(n), s
)⊃ ((∃m)(Holds(AtFloor(E1,m), s)
∧ State(Do(Call(n), s))= State(s)− AtFloor(E1,m)+ AtFloor(E1,n)))
∨ ((∃m)(Holds(AtFloor(E2,m), s)
∧ State(Do(Call(n), s))= State(s)− AtFloor(E2,m)+ AtFloor(E2,n))) (56)
Put in words, calling an elevator to a ﬂoor n has the indeterminate effect that either of the two elevators arrives.
We claim that this domain axiomatization entails the following implicit effect (which does not follow from (56) alone):
Poss
(
Call(0), s
)⊃ Holds(AtFloor(E2,0),Do(Call(0), s)) (57)
To see why, note that State(Do(Call(0), s)) = State(s)− AtFloor(E1,m)+ AtFloor(E1,0) implies
Holds
(
AtFloor(E1,0),Do
(
Call(0), s
))
according to Theorem 12. By (54), therefore, the ﬁrst disjunct in state update axiom (56) is false if substituted by {n 
→ 0}.
This entails (57) according to (56) and Theorem 12.
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The examples in the previous section show that the problem of domain axiomatizations not being modular arises in
many different action formalisms. With the help of our unifying action calculus, we can give a general, formal deﬁnition
of what are implicit domain constraints, preconditions, and effects. To this end, we introduce the following notation for a
given action A(x). In a domain axiomatization with precondition axioms Π , by ΠA we denote the one which is for A(x),
with πA[s] being its right-hand side as usual. Likewise, if Υ are the effect axioms, then by ΥA we denote the one for action
A(x). For notational convenience, we will refrain from stating the foundational axioms of a domain axiomatization. These
are tacitly assumed to be satisﬁable, and entailment (|) and consistency of sets of formulas is always meant to be modulo
them.
Deﬁnition 15. Consider a domain axiomatization Σ = Δ ∪ Π ∪ Υ consisting of domain constraints Δ, precondition axioms
Π , and effect axioms Υ .
1. The domain axiomatization is free of implicit domain constraints if for every state formula δ[t],
Σ | δ[t]
implies Δ | δ[t].
2. The domain axiomatization is free of implicit preconditions if for every action A(x) and state formula π [s],
Σ | Poss(A(x), s, t)⊃ π [s]
implies Δ∪ΠA | Poss(A(x), s, t) ⊃ π [s].
3. The domain axiomatization is free of implicit effects if for every action A(x) and state formula ε[t],
Σ | Poss(A(x), s, t)⊃ ε[t]
implies Δ[S] ∪ΠA[S] ∪ΥA[S, T ] | Poss(A(x), S, T ) ⊃ ε[T ], for any constants S, T of sort time.
Put in words, an implicit domain constraint is a (universally quantiﬁed) state formula which is entailed by the entire
domain axiomatization but which cannot be derived from the given domain constraints Δ alone. An implicit precondition
is entailed by the entire domain axiomatization but does not follow from the precondition axioms alone in a state that
satisﬁes the domain constraints. The rationale behind this deﬁnition is the following: given a state that satisﬁes the domain
constraints Δ, the precondition axiom for an action A alone should suﬃce to entail all executability conditions for this
action. Finally, an implicit effect follows from the entire domain axiomatization but not from an effect axiom alone in a
state that satisﬁes the preconditions of an action and the domain constraints. The rationale behind this deﬁnition is this:
given a state that satisﬁes both the domain constraints Δ and the preconditions of an action A, the instantiated effect
axiom for this action alone should suﬃce to infer everything that can be concluded of the resulting state. The use of time
constants in item 3 is motivated by the desire to verify modularity in a local fashion, that is, by instantiating the domain
constraints and precondition axioms by a single time point, and the effect axioms by this time point and its successor.
We now use our unifying calculus to provide three conditions which will then be shown to guarantee that a domain
axiomatization is free of implicit dependencies. Informally speaking, the ﬁrst condition below, (C1), essentially says that for
every state at some time S which is consistent with the domain constraints and in which an action A(x) is applicable, the
condition Φi[S] for at least one case i in the effect axiom for A holds. Condition (C2) implies that none of the applicable
effect speciﬁcations is self-contradictory, and (C3) requires that any possible update leads to a state that satisﬁes the domain
constraints. Here and in the following, we consider only ramiﬁcation-free domain axiomatizations according to Deﬁnition 6,
so that the sub-formulas Γ +i and Γ
−
i in effect axioms (cf. (2)) are state formulas solely in s.
Deﬁnition 16. Let S, T be constants of sort time. A domain axiomatization Δ ∪ Π ∪ Υ is called modular if the following
holds for every action A(x) with effect axiom (1): there exist arbitrary time constants S, T such that
| Δ[S] ∧πA[S] ⊃
k∨
i=1
(∃yi)Φi[S] (C1)
and, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,k},
| Δ[S] ∧πA[S] ∧Φi[S] ∧ Γ +i [S] ⊃ ¬Γ −i [S] (C2)
| Δ[S] ∧πA[S] ∧Υi[S, T ] ⊃ Δ[T ] (C3)
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so doing, an advantage is that these conditions can be veriﬁed separately for each action of a domain signature.
We are now ready to prove our main result, which says that modular domain axiomatizations are free of implicit domain
constraints, preconditions, and effects. We begin by proving that if a state formula is consistent with the domain constraints,
then it is also consistent with the entire domain axiomatization.
Lemma 17. Consider a sequential and ramiﬁcation-free domain axiomatization Δ ∪ Π ∪ Υ which satisﬁes conditions (C1)–(C3). Let
S be an arbitrary constant of sort time and ψ(S) a state formula in S, then
Δ[S] ∪ {ψ[S]} is consistent (58)
implies that Δ∪Π ∪Υ ∪ {ψ[S]} is consistent.
Proof. Let I ′ be an arbitrary model for Δ[S] ∪ {ψ[S]}. From this we can straightforwardly obtain a model I in which SI is
the least element of <I . We then construct a model J as follows.
1. For every ﬂuent ϕ ,
Holds(ϕ, S)J iff Holds(ϕ, S)I (59)
2. Given that the domain axiomatization is sequential, we can iteratively construct the following assignment for every σ
in the domain of I for sort time, starting with SI , and for every action α = A(x)I and time point τ >I σ :
(a) Let πα be the right-hand side of the precondition axiom for A, then
Poss(α,σ , τ )J iff J | πα{s 
→ σ , t 
→ τ } (60)
(b) Let (1) be α’s effect axiom. If Poss(α,σ , τ )J then choose some i = 1, . . . ,k and some yi such that Φi[σ ]J , and for
every ﬂuent ϕ let
Holds(ϕ, τ )J if J | Γ +i [σ ]{ f 
→ ϕ}
¬Holds(ϕ, τ )J if J | Γ −i [σ ]{ f 
→ ϕ} (61)
The existence of some such i and yi is guaranteed by assumption (C1), and consistency of the assignment (61)
follows from assumption (C2).
Then J is a model for ψ[S] due to (59), for Π due to (60), for Υ due to (61), and for Δ due to (58) and (C3). 
Next, we show that a state formula ψ[T ] is consistent with the entire domain axiomatization if only it is consistent
with an instance of an update ΥA[S, T ] for a state at time S that satisﬁes the domain constraints and the preconditions of
action A.
Lemma 18. Consider a sequential and ramiﬁcation-free domain axiomatizationΣ = Δ∪Π ∪Υ which satisﬁes conditions (C1)–(C3).
Let A(x) be an action, S, T be arbitrary constants of sort time, and ψ[T ] a state formula in T , then
Δ[S] ∪ {πA[S]{t 
→ T }}∪ ΥA[S, T ] ∪ {ψ[T ]} is consistent
implies
Σ ∪ {Poss(A(x), S, T )}∪ {ψ[T ]} is consistent.
Proof. Let I be a model for Δ[S]∪{πA[S]{t 
→ T }}∪ΥA[S, T ]∪{ψ[T ]}. We construct a model J as in the proof of Lemma 17
and with a speciﬁc assignment for the state at time T :
Holds(ϕ, T )J iff Holds(ϕ, T )I (62)
for every ϕ in the domain of I for sort ﬂuent. This is consistent with Υ because I is a model for ΥA[S, T ]. As above, J
is a model for Σ , a model for ψ[T ] due to (62), and for Poss(A(x), S, T ) since I is a model for πA[S]{t 
→ T }. 
With the help of these two lemmas we can now prove our main result.
8 It is worth noting that condition (C2) is trivially true for both successor state axioms in the Situation Calculus and (consistent) state update axioms in
the Fluent Calculus, because the corresponding formulas Γ +i and Γ
−
i in the general effect axioms are always negations of each other (cf. axiom (38)).
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Proof. Let Σ be a modular domain axiomatization with domain constraints Δ, precondition axioms Π , and effect axioms Υ .
Consider an arbitrary state formula δ[t]. If Σ | δ[t] then Σ ∪ {¬δ[t]} is inconsistent. By Lemma 17, Δ ∪ {¬δ[t]} is
inconsistent, hence Δ | δ[t]. This shows that Σ is free of implicit domain constraints.
Consider a state formula π [s]. If Σ | Poss(A(x), s, t) ⊃ π [s] then Σ | πA[s] ⊃ π [s], where πA is the right-hand side of
the precondition axiom for A(x). Hence, Σ ∪ {πA[s] ∧¬π [s]} is inconsistent. By Lemma 17, Δ∪ {πA[s] ∧¬π [s]} is inconsis-
tent, hence Δ | πA[s] ⊃ π [s], hence Δ∪Π | Poss(A(x), s, t) ⊃ π [s]. This shows that Σ is free of implicit preconditions.
Finally, consider an action A(x) along with a state formula ε[t]. If Σ | Poss(A(x), s, t) ⊃ ε[t] then Σ ∪ {πA[S]{t 
→ T } ∧
¬ε[T ]} is inconsistent for any S, T of sort time. By Lemma 18, Δ[S] ∪ {πA[S]{t 
→ T }} ∪ ΥA[S, T ] ∪ {¬ε[T ]} is inconsistent,
hence Δ[S] ∪ΠA[S] ∪ΥA[S, T ] | Poss(A(x), S, T ) ⊃ ε[T ]. This shows that Σ is free of implicit effects. 
We conclude our analysis by illustrating how the general method can be easily instantiated and applied in order to verify
independence in each of the speciﬁc approaches of the Situation-, Event-, and Fluent Calculus.
4.2.1. Modularity in the situation calculus
In Section 3.2.2 we have seen how a speciﬁc class of domain axiomatizations in the unifying action calculus can be
mapped onto successor state axioms. The converse translation of action theories in the Situation Calculus consisting of
domain constraints, precondition axioms, and basic successor state axioms in the sense of [31] is straightforward: domain
constraints are taken as they are, precondition axioms of the form (42) are re-written into the form (35), and the successor
state axioms (40) for all ﬂuents F together are mapped onto the effect axiom schema
Poss(a, s, t) ⊃ (∀ f )
[∨
F
(
f = F (u)∧ (Γ +F [s] ∨ Holds( f , s)∧ ¬Γ −F [s]) ⊃ Holds( f , t))
]
∧ (∀ f )
[∨
F
(
f = F (u)∧ (Γ −F [s] ∨ ¬Holds( f , s)∧ ¬Γ +F [s])⊃ ¬Holds( f , t))
]
The action variable a in this schema can then be instantiated by all actions of the domain in order to obtain actual effect
axioms in the unifying calculus. By deﬁnition, these axiomatizations are ramiﬁcation-free, and the foundational axioms of
the Situation Calculus, (30), imply sequentiality according to Deﬁnition 5. Based on this translation, the veriﬁcation of the
modularity conditions in Situation Calculus axiomatizations is straightforward.
Example 6 (Continued). We have seen that the given axiomatization entails an implicit domain constraint. Indeed, in-
dependence condition (C3) is not entailed. To see why, take arbitrary time constants S and T and consider the action
Unschedule( j). Successor state axioms (47) determine an update formula which is equivalent to
Υ1[S, T ] :=
[
Holds
(
Job(m, i), T
)≡ Holds(Job(m, i), S)∧ i = j]
∧ [Holds(Free(m), T )≡ Holds(Job(m, j), S)∨ Holds(Free(m), S)]
Along with
Δ[S] := Holds(Free(n), S)⊃ ¬(∃k)Holds(Job(n,k), S)
πUnschedule[S] := (∃m)Holds
(
Job(m, j), S
)
this does not entail
Δ[T ] := Holds(Free(n), T )⊃ ¬(∃k)Holds(Job(n,k), T )
To see why, consider an interpretation that satisﬁes
Holds
(
Job(M, J ), S
)
, Holds
(
Job(M, I), S
)
, ¬Holds(Free(M), S)
¬Holds(Job(M, J ), T ), Holds(Job(M, I), T ), Holds(Free(M), T )
It is easy to verify that this is a model for the conjunction Δ[S]∧πUnschedule[S]∧Υ1[S, T ]{i 
→ I, j 
→ J } but not for Δ[T ].9
9 The reader may verify that (C3) is entailed, however, once the implicit domain constraint (48) is added.
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In Section 3.1.2 we have seen how a speciﬁc class of domain axiomatizations in the unifying action calculus can be
mapped onto the simple Event Calculus. This translation can be easily reversed. The only required generalization is to
additionally axiomatize the special action Inert as in Example 3 to capture arbitrary sequential narratives, based on an
arbitrary linear time structure (like, e.g., the positive real numbers) and where actions may not immediately follow each
other. With regard to verifying modularity, it is easy to see that the axioms for Inert (cf. (12) and (13)) satisfy the
conditions (C1)–(C3).
Example 7 (Continued). We have seen that the given axiomatization entails an implicit precondition. Indeed, independence
condition (C2) is not entailed. To see why, take an arbitrary time constant S and consider the action Go(x, y). Initiation and
termination axioms (52) determine effect formulas in the unifying action calculus where
Γ +1 [S] := f = At(y)∨ Holds( f , S)∧ f = At(x)
Γ −1 [S] := f = At(x)∨ ¬Holds( f , S)∧ f = At(y)
Then Γ +1 [S] in conjunction with
Δ[S] := Holds(At(l1), S)∧ Holds(At(l2), S)⊃ l1 = l2
Φ1[S] := 
πGo[S] := Holds
(
At(x), S
)
does not entail ¬Γ −1 [S]. This can be easily seen by an interpretation that satisﬁes x= y.10
4.2.3. Modularity in the Fluent Calculus
In Section 3.2.1 we have shown how basic Fluent Calculus theories can be mapped onto domain axiomatizations in the
unifying calculus. This mapping can be directly applied to verify modularity of these theories with the help of our general
method.
Example 8 (Continued). We have seen that the given axiomatization entails an implicit effect. Indeed, independence condi-
tion (C3) is not entailed. To see why, take arbitrary time constants S and T and consider the action Call(n). State update
axiom (56) determines an effect formula in the unifying action calculus where
Υ1[S, T ] := (∃m)
(
Holds
(
AtFloor(E1,m), S
)
∧ ( f = AtFloor(E1,n)∨ Holds( f , S)∧ f = At(E1,m) ⊃ Holds( f , T ))
∧ ( f = At(E1,m)∨ ¬Holds( f , S)∧ f = AtFloor(E1,n) ⊃ ¬Holds( f , T )))
Υ2[S, T ] := (∃m)
(
Holds
(
AtFloor(E2,m), S
)
∧ ( f = AtFloor(E2,n)∨ Holds( f , S)∧ f = At(E2,m) ⊃ Holds( f , T ))
∧ ( f = At(E2,m)∨ ¬Holds( f , S)∧ f = AtFloor(E2,m) ⊃ ¬Holds( f , T )))
For the instance {n 
→ 0}, Υ1[S, T ] along with
Δ[S] := (∃!k)Holds(AtFloor(e,k), S)∧ ¬Holds(AtFloor(E1,0), S)
πCall[S] := 0 n 9∧ ¬(∃e)Holds
(
AtFloor(e,n), s
)
implies Holds(At(E1,0), T ). This, however, contradicts Δ[T ].11
5. Discussion
We have proposed a unifying action calculus which abstracts from a concrete time structure and a speciﬁc solution to
the Frame Problem and thus encompasses a variety of existing, speciﬁc languages for axiomatizing action domains. This
unifying approach can be used as an intermediary language to facilitate translations of speciﬁc calculi into each other. We
have exempliﬁed this by obtaining two new results: a characterization of ADL planning problems in the Event Calculus and
an embedding of the full basic Fluent Calculus into a variant of the Situation Calculus with nondeterministic successor state
axioms. Generally speaking, the use of an intermediary axiomatization has two major advantages. First, it makes explicit
10 The reader may verify that (C2) is entailed, however, once the implicit precondition (53) is added.
11 The reader may verify that (C3) is entailed, however, once the implicit effect (57) is incorporated into the state update axiom.
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This often makes it easier to ﬁnd an appropriate translation into a different solution to the Frame Problem. As an example,
the domain axiomatization we have obtained in Section 3.2.1 from a basic Fluent Calculus theory not only gives a clear
indication of how the effect axioms can be translated into successor state axioms, it also illustrates very explicitly what
extension of Reiter’s basic action theories is needed in order to capture the various ways in which nondeterministic actions
can be axiomatized by state update axioms in the Fluent Calculus. Second, the prior translation of an input language into an
intermediary language should allow for a generic and uniform way of embedding the input formalism into different target
languages. The domain axiomatization we have obtained in Section 3.1.1 as a characterization for ADL planning problems,
for example, can be readily used to deﬁne mappings into approaches other than the Event Calculus.
Among the variety of potential applications of inter-calculi translations, we consider the following ones most important.
1. Translations can be used to prove that (a well-deﬁned class of) a speciﬁc calculus can be formally embedded in another
calculus.
2. The use of an implementation of a calculus to solve problems given in a different input language requires a prior
translation; examples are the problem speciﬁcation languages used for the Planning Competitions [6] or the General
Game Description Language used for the General Game Playing Contest [8].
3. In order to use a different platform to run knowledge-based agent programs written in languages like GOLOG or FLUX,
the background knowledge of the agent needs to be transformed into an appropriate encoding.
In comparison to related work, much like the systematic assessment methods of [33] or the Action Description Language
A [7] and extensions thereof, our unifying calculus can be used to analyze the relative expressiveness of different axiom-
atization techniques in comparison. The main difference is that the former deﬁne a speciﬁc semantics for action domains
rather than providing a purely logical axiomatization. This implies that the assessments are always restricted to problem
classes that can be deﬁned within the special semantics. For example, Action Description Language A has been translated
into both successor state axioms [16] and state update axioms [39]. These results can be combined into a translation from
the Fluent Calculus into the Situation Calculus and vice versa, but this translation is conﬁned to domains that can be ex-
pressed in A and therefore does not allow for a full embedding of basic Fluent Calculus theories into the Situation Calculus.
In the second part of the paper, we have used the unifying calculus to develop a general method for verifying inde-
pendence of domain constraints, preconditions, and effects in axiomatizations of action domains. We have shown how this
general method can be easily instantiated for various speciﬁc calculi. Existing results on the problem of implicit dependen-
cies are restricted to speciﬁc calculi and less general classes of domains. In [30], it has been shown that precondition axioms
and deterministic successor state axioms in the Situation Calculus are always independent, provided that there are no do-
main constraints at all. In [15], algorithms have been presented for inferring implicit domain constraints and preconditions
from domain axiomatizations given in propositional modal logic. A conceptually different approach has been pursued in
[27], where it has been shown how a particular class of domain constraints can be compiled into successor state axioms
(deterministic only). Incidentally, condition (C3) in our Deﬁnition 16 is already known in this context as a way to ensure
that, if satisﬁed by a given initial situation, the result of such a compilation allows to ignore the domain constraints. In our
context, however, this condition serves a different purpose: instead of showing that, for speciﬁc initial situations, the given
domain constraints are redundant, it shows that no further domain constraints are entailed (independent of the initial situ-
ation). With regard to the Event Calculus, it should be stressed that our result is restricted to sequential domains. However,
our unifying calculus can be readily used to express concurrent actions, simply by taking as the elements of the sort action
collections of (simultaneous or overlapping) actions. It remains an issue for future work to deﬁne a concrete sound and
complete mapping of domains with concurrent actions given, say, in the Event Calculus, into our unifying calculus in which
single actions may represent collections of actual actions, which would then allow to apply our modularity conditions as
they are.
For future work along a different line, our unifying action calculus can be readily used for comparing and assessing
action formalisms other than those considered in this paper, and to generalize the speciﬁc translations we have developed
to more general classes of domain axiomatizations. Most notably, our approach to abstract from concrete solutions to the
Frame Problem should facilitate formal comparisons of the many different existing solutions to the Ramiﬁcation Problem,
thus going beyond comparisons based on speciﬁc example scenarios only.
With regard to the result in the second part of the paper, it would be worthwhile for the future to develop a general sys-
tem for the automatic veriﬁcation of modularity. By extracting implicit domain constraints, preconditions, and effects from
failed attempts to prove the independence conditions, such a system could assist knowledge engineers with the design of
“good” axiomatizations. A different line of future work could be the use of the unifying calculus as a method of abstraction
for analyzing other problems of general interest across speciﬁc calculi.
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